The increasing popularity of radical right parties in Western Europe has received widespread attention. Despite a rather large literature on parties with explicitly anti-immigrant platforms, there is surprisingly little consensus about the underlying political ideology of this party family and its supporters. Particularly lacking is cross-national research that maps party positions in two-dimensional political space over time. Using Manifesto Project Data (1970-2010), we analyse election platforms of parties the literature has identified as radical right and show that they have qualitatively changed between 1970 and 2010. Current parties differ fundamentally from their predecessors in that nationalist claims are paramount. We use the European Social Survey (2002-2010) to confirm that voters' attitudes are consistent with contemporary parties' platforms. Our results point to a coherent political ideology, which may partially explain these parties' recent electoral successes. Based on our combined analyses, we conclude that contemporary anti-immigrant parties constitute a new and distinct party family, which we term neo-nationalist.
This article explores differences in the pattern of political participation between immigrants and the majority population in Western Europe. Using data from the European Social Survey, I find that for immigrants the pattern of political participation is less distinct, that is, participation types are more strongly related than for the majority population; and that this cannot be explained by differences in levels of resources and engagement, but by differences in the importance of mobilization and by the amount of time spent in the new country of residence. This indicates that the explanatory mechanisms operate differently for immigrants than the majority, impacting not only on the decision on whether not to participate, but also on how. These findings are important, not only for what they tell us about the process of political integration, but also for how we study political participation more broadly.
This study analyses the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on youth unemployment and employment rates in Western Europe. It differentiates between two components of EPL: job security provisions and regulations on temporary contracts. While deregulating job security provisions is expected to lower youth unemployment, the impact of deregulating temporary contracts is ambiguous, but should depend on the strictness of job security provisions. A literature review and replication of prior research demonstrate that much prior evidence linking EPL to higher youth unemployment is not robust to important or minor specification checks. The empirical analysis uses aggregate data from 16 Western European countries and the United States for the period from 1980 to 2008 (N = 461) and fixed effects and differences-in-differences estimation. While effects of job security provisions are inconsistent across specifications, there is suggestive evidence that deregulating temporary contracts at high levels of job security provisions has significantly increased youth unemployment rates and lowered youth employment rates.
Within the social capital literature it is often assumed that membership of voluntary associations causes generalized social trust and not the other way around. This study challenges this assumption by investigating if generalized social trust causes membership in a novel design that yields valid results despite possible feed-back effects from membership to trust. Using individual-level data from several countries, the article shows that trust does increase membership. Treating associational membership as exogenous to trust produces biased results, it is therefore concluded. Moreover, the study provides rare individual-level evidence for a connection between generalized social trust and collective action in that generalized social trust in particular increases membership of associations producing public goods.
In this study, we examine the relationship between institutions of labour market and welfare states and two central aspects of job quality: autonomy and job security. Drawing on theoretical frameworks from varieties of capitalism and a power resource approach, we examine whether macro-level features can explain country differences in perceived autonomy and job security. In multi-level analyses, we combine institutional data with data from the European Social Survey (ESS), which contains information on 13,414 employees from 19 countries. We report three main findings: first, we find high autonomy in the Nordic countries and low autonomy and job security in transition countries; second, the institutional features—union density and skill specificity—are positively associated with autonomy; third, unemployment rate is the most important factor in explaining country differences in perceived job security. Our findings suggest that the power of workers and their skill specificity are important in explaining cross-country differences in autonomy. The study shows that a multi-level approach may help explain how institutions shape employment outcomes.
This paper analyses how and when men and women devote their extra time to childcare and housework by exploiting an exogenous shock in scheduling: the partial implementation of the 35-hour workweek reform in France. Using propensity score matching and the most recent time use survey (INSEE, 2010), we show that time reallocations differ by gender and day of the week. While men dedicate their extra time to performing more housework on weekdays in the form of mainly time-flexible tasks such as repairs or shopping, they do less on weekends. This shift from weekends to weekdays is not observed for women who perform day-to-day tasks that are less transferable. Women spend more time on childcare and reduce multitasking. Overall, task specialization by gender is more pronounced, and this gendered use of similar extra time illustrates that time allocation is not only a question of time availability. In particular, men and women ‘do gender’ at weekends, when performing tasks is more visible to others.
Men have historically attained more education than women, but this gender imbalance in education has reversed in many countries. In recent cohorts, the wife typically has as much as or more education than the husband. Using data from the European Union's Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (N = 95,389 for 27 countries), this article investigates to what extent the newly emerging pattern of educational assortative mating is associated with a higher proportion of women who out-earn their partners in Europe. We find that this proportion varies on the country level between 20 per cent and almost 50 per cent for childless women and is generally much lower for women with small children. However, if a woman is better educated than her partner, this clearly increases the odds that she earns more than half of the couple's joint earnings. This happens to such an extent that it reduces the effect of motherhood on the wife's relative earnings: college-educated mothers of school-age children with less educated partners are nearly as likely to be main breadwinners as college-educated childless women in a homogamous union.
We develop a rational choice model of educational decision-making in which the utility of educational choices depends on students’ risk aversion and their time discounting preferences. We argue for the role of risk aversion and time discounting preferences in the choice of different tracks in secondary education and in mediating the impact of socioeconomic background on such choices. Enrolment decisions in Danish secondary education provide our empirical example, and the results are generally in line with the proposed theory in that (i) risk aversion deters students from choosing the academically challenging but economically rewarding academic track in secondary education, (ii) students with a low time discount rate are particularly likely to enter the academic track, and (iii) students from advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds are not affected by risk aversion when making educational decisions.
In this article we use recent survey data to test three arguments on the relationship between social stratification and cultural consumption: i.e. what we label as the homology, individualization and omnivore-univore arguments. We note various conceptual and methodological problems in the ways these arguments have been advanced, and stress in particular the importance of maintaining the Weberian distinction between class and status. We concentrate on musical consumption and apply latent class models to identify types of musical consumer. We then examine the social character of these types through a regression analysis that includes a range of demographic and stratification variables. As would be anticipated from a Weberian standpoint, type of musical consumption proves to be more closely associated with status, and also with education, than with class. In general, our results provide little support for the homology or individualisation arguments. They are more consonant with the omnivore-univore argument, although a number of qualifications to this are also suggested.
Explanations of anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe have been centred around the labour market competition and group threat theories. The article tests these theories with the data from Russia and finds some support for the group threat theory. Attitudes towards several immigrant ethnic groups are analysed separately. While Russians generally accept Ukrainians and Moldovans as their potential neighbours, they are more hostile to immigrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia. This ethnic hierarchy is shared by all large ethnic groups populating Russia. The analysis of regional-level covariates of anti-immigrant sentiment shows that higher concentration of immigrants is associated with more negative attitudes towards most immigrant groups, except Ukrainians. Poorer regions are more xenophobic. The predictive power of statistical models explaining anti-immigrant prejudice is considerably lower in Russia compared with Western European countries. The article discusses to what extent standard explanations of anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe can be applied in Russia.
While various studies have already shown that people prefer high-over low-skilled migrants, we know surprisingly little why this is so. This article tries to close this gap by investigating three explanatory models. (i) According to the labour market competition model, citizens oppose immigrants with the same skill levels who are perceived as competitors on the job market. (ii) According to the welfare state model, low-skilled immigrants' use of public services is disproportionally higher than their contribution to tax revenues contrary to high-skilled immigrants. (iii) According to the deservingness model, high-skilled immigrants are preferred, as low-skilled immigrants are considered as lazy people who would be as well off as natives if they only tried harder. As one of the first studies outside the United States, these arguments are tested by means of an experimental online survey in Switzerland. Respondents were randomly assigned to evaluate low-and high-skilled immigrants. We find that different groups prefer high-over low-skilled immigrants for different reasons: While the labour market competition model does not play a role, the welfare state model only holds for natives who are well off in regions with low taxes. Finally, attitudes on deservingness explain preference of high-skilled immigrants only if the respondents have a high income.
Abstract The aim of this study is to unravel the impact of societal change in West Germany on educational attainment and its attendant social disparities for cohorts born between 1919 and 1986. Therefore, we analyse whether modernization trends have modified access to, and success in, general, vocational, and higher education for consecutive birth cohorts. To explain how these processes have affected class differentials in educational attainment, we assume that the interplay of the changing occupational structure at the macro level and intergenerational status maintenance via investment in the education of offspring is—among other influences—the key mechanism for long-term educational expansion and for decreasing inequalities of opportunity in the educational system. The empirical bases of our investigation are clusters of time series for macro changes and retrospective individual data for 11 birth cohorts from the German Life History Study and the National Educational Panel Study for educational outcomes. We apply piecewise exponential event-history models to analyse the direct and indirect impacts of societal change on educational trajectories and social disparities in educational attainment. The results provide an understanding of historical variations in educational transitions and attainment associated with modernization in the social, political, economic, and cultural spheres.