Objective: Powered mobility devices (PMDs) are commonly used as aids for older people and people with disabilities, subgroups of vulnarable road users (VRUs) who are rarely noted in traffic safety contexts. However, the problem of accidents involving PMD drivers has been reported in many countries where these vehicles have become increasingly popular. The aim of this study is to extract and analyze national PMD-related accident and injury data reported to the Swedish Traffic Accident Data Acquisition (STRADA) database. The results will provide valuable insight into the risks and obstacles that PMD drivers are exposed to in the traffic environment and may contribute to improving the mobility of this group in the long term. Methods: The current study is based on data from 743 accidents and 998 persons. An analysis was performed on a subset of data (N = 301) in order to investigate the development of accidents over a period of 10 years. Thereafter, each accident in the whole data set was registered as either single (N = 427) or collision (N = 315). Results: The results show that there was a 3-fold increase in the number of PMD-related accidents reported to STRADA during the period 2007-2016. With regard to single accidents, collisions, as well as fatalities, the injury statistics were dominated by males. Single accidents were more common than collisions (N = 427 and N = 316, respectively) and the level of injury sustained in each type of accident is on par. The vast majority of single accidents resulted in the PMD driver impacting the ground (87%), due to either PMD turnover (71%) or the driver falling out of the PMD (16%). The reason for many of the single accidents was a difference in ground level (34%, typically a curb). Cars, trucks, or buses were involved in 67% of collision events; these occured predominantly at junctions or intersections (70%). Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) 3+ injuries were dominated by hip and head injuries in both single accidents and collision events. Conclusions: The present study shows that further research on PMD accidents is required, with regard to both single accidents and collision events. To ensure that appropriate decisions are made, future work should follow up on injury trends and further improve the quality of PDM-related accident data. Improved vehicle stability and design, increased usage of safety equipment, proper training programs, effective maintenance services, and development of a supporting infrastructure would contribute to increased safety for PMD drivers.
Accident investigation manuals are influential documents on various levels in a safety management system, and it is therefore important to appraise them in the light of what we currently know – or assume – about the nature of accidents. Investigation manuals necessarily embody or represent an accident model, i.e., a set of assumptions about how accidents happen and what the important factors are. In this paper we examine three aspects of accident investigation as described in a number of investigation manuals. Firstly, we focus on accident models and in particular the assumptions about how different factors interact to cause – or prevent – accidents, i.e., the accident “mechanisms”. Secondly, we focus on the scope in the sense of the factors (or factor domains) that are considered in the models – for instance (hu)man, technology, and organization (MTO). Thirdly, we focus on the system of investigation or the activities that together constitute an accident investigation project/process. We found that the manuals all used complex linear models. The factors considered were in general (hu)man, technology, organization, and information. The causes found during an investigation reflect the assumptions of the accident model, following the ‘What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find’ or WYLFIWYF principle. The identified causes typically became specific problems to be fixed during an implementation of solutions. This follows what can be called ‘What-You-Find-Is-What-You-Fix’ or WYFIWYF principle.
•High jerk events measured from CAN Bus data of a nationwide field study of 72 drivers.•Negative binomial regressions indicate relationship between crash rate and jerk rate.•Connected fleet demonstrated to be representative of the overall vehicle population.•Crash frequency predicted through regressions on jerk rate and fleet trip frequency.•Spatial regression of crash frequency across the majority of the Swiss road network. Despite the fact that semi-autonomous vehicles will become more and more prevalent in the coming decades, recent studies have highlighted that traffic accidents will persist as a core issue for road users, insurers, and policy makers alike. Researchers and industry players see potential in the technology embedded in semi-autonomous vehicles to combat this challenge by reliably predicting locations with a high likelihood of traffic accidents. This technology can be leveraged to detect accidents and ‘near miss incidents’, such as heavy braking and evasive manoeuvres, otherwise known as Critical Driving Events (CDEs). The locations of CDEs could identify areas of high accident exposure, offering automotive insurers a unique opportunity to reduce traffic accidents through the adoption of active loss prevention business models, such as providing safe-routing services and in-vehicle warnings. To date, there is limited empirical evidence on whether the Crash Frequency and Crash Rate of locations can be accurately identified through CDEs. To address this research gap, an 18-week naturalistic driving field study of 72 vehicles was conducted in Switzerland, covering over 690,000 km. Data collected from the CAN Bus of these vehicles indicate that there is a proportional relationship between the CDEs of the fleet, and the Crash Frequency and Crash Rate of a location. Furthermore, a nationwide spatial regression analysis was applied to determine Crash Frequency across the majority of the Swiss road network. We identify the relationship between Crash Frequency, and the CDEs and Trip Frequency of the fleet, along with additional explanatory variables for urban and highway locations. These insights provide first evidence that insurance companies and other industry players with access to a nationwide semi-autonomous fleet can determine existing and emerging locations of high accident probability, enabling more proactive business models and safety focused services.
This article investigates cases in which harms are statistically correlated. When parties are risk averse, correlation plays an important role in the choice between liability rules. Specifically, positively correlated harms favor a liability rule that spreads the risk over a multitude of parties, as in the negligence rule. Negatively correlated harms favor a liability rule that pools risks together, as in strict liability. The same applies when parties can purchase costly insurance (first party or third party). This policy recommendation is in line with current products liability law, which places design defects and warning failures under a de facto negligence regime.
Information of occupational accidents is not standardized worldwide. Especially, developing countries do not have reliable information on their occupational accidents due to lack of proper recording and notification systems. The number of accidents is under-reported but figures are still used as a baseline for occupational safety work. In this paper global estimates of occupational accidents are presented for 175 countries. These estimates are based on figures from selected countries in eight different regions. Global estimates help to compare different countries and regions to each other to detect improvements in safety and safety work. In 1998 the average estimated number of fatal occupational accidents was 350 000 and there were 264 million non-fatal accidents. Global estimates are needed to guide national policies and decision-making.
•Traditional causal analysis tools have limitations in accident analysis.•Systems thinking approach was applied in “7.23” accident analysis.•The archetype of “shifting the burden” was adopted.•The “quick fixes” were identified and the symptomatic solutions were found.•Fundamental solutions were explored and side-effects were depicted. Learning from accidents contributes to improvement of safety and prevention of unwanted events. How much we can learn depends on how deeply we analyze the accident phenomenon. Traditional causal analysis tools have limitations when analyzing the dynamic complexity of major incidents from a linear cause and effect perspective. By contrast, systems thinking is an approach of “seeing the forest for the trees” which emphasizes the circular nature of complex systems and can create a clearer picture of the dynamic systematic structures which have contributed to the occurrence of a major incident. The “7.23” Yong-Tai-Wen railway accident is considered to be the most serious railway accident in Chinese railway history and this research analyzed the accident using the systems thinking approach. From the national accident investigation report, the system elements were identified and the causal loop diagram was developed, based on the system archetype of “shifting the burden”. For the problem symptoms in the accident report, the causal loop diagram not only illustrated their symptomatic solutions, but also identified their fundamental solutions. Disclosing how an underlying systemic structure finally resulted in a major accident assists the reader to prevent such accidents by starting from fundamentals.
Comparative assessment of accident risks in the energy sector is a key aspect in a comprehensive evaluation of sustainability and energy security concerns. Safety performance of energy systems can have important implications on the environmental, economic and social dimensions of sustainability as well as availability, acceptability and accessibility aspects of energy security. Therefore, this study provides a broad comparison of energy technologies based on the objective expression of accident risks for complete energy chains. For fossil chains and hydropower the extensive historical experience available in PSI׳s Energy-related Severe Accident Database (ENSAD) is used, whereas for nuclear a simplified probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is applied, and evaluations of new renewables are based on a combination of available data, modeling, and expert judgment. Generally, OECD and EU 27 countries perform better than non-OECD. Fatality rates are lowest for Western hydropower and nuclear as well as for new renewables. In contrast, maximum consequences can be by far highest for nuclear and hydro, intermediate for fossil, and very small for new renewables, which are less prone to severe accidents. Centralized, low-carbon technology options could generally contribute to achieve large reductions in CO2-emissions; however, the principal challenge for both fossil with Carbon Capture and Storage and nuclear is public acceptance. Although, external costs of severe accidents are significantly smaller than those caused by air pollution, accidents can have disastrous and long-term impacts. Overall, no technology performs best or worst in all respects, thus tradeoffs and priorities are needed to balance the conflicting objectives such as energy security, sustainability and risk aversion to support rationale decision making. •Accident risks are compared across a broad range of energy technologies.•Analysis of historical experience was based on the comprehensive database ENSAD.•OECD and EU 27 performed significantly better than non-OECD countries.•External costs of accidents are very small, but impacts can still be enormous.•No technology performs best for all risk indicators; thus tradeoffs are inevitable.
In a rare effort to internalize congestion costs, London recently instituted charges for traveling by car to the central city during peak hours. Although the theoretical influence on the number and severity of traffic accidents is ambiguous, we show that the policy generated a substantial reduction in both the number of accidents and in the accident rate. At the same time, the spatial, temporal and vehicle specific nature of the charge may cause unintended substitutions as traffic and accidents shift to other proximate areas, times and to uncharged vehicles. We demonstrate that, to the contrary, the congestion charge reduced accidents and the accident rate in adjacent areas, times and for uncharged vehicles. These results are consistent with the government's objective to use the congestion charge to more broadly promote public transport and change driving habits. •Estimate effect of London congestion charge on accidents and accident rates•Theoretical effect is ambiguous, less traffic but higher speeds.•Show robust, large reductions in number and rate of accidents and fatalities•These reductions spill over to proximate areas, times and uncharged vehicles.
•Accidents were not associated with safe driving.•Near-accidents were associated with a decrease in the safe driving.•Learned caution is associated with assuming personal responsibility. The focus of this article is risky behavior in traffic. What do people learn from accidents and near-accidents? Experience with accidents may demand increased caution. However, near-accidents are inherently ambiguous: On the one hand, they signal that margins were good enough, inspiring increased risk-taking; on the other hand, they signal danger that could induce increased caution. To explore these issues, participants (N = 614) answered 47 questions related to safe traffic behavior as well as reported on their experiences with traffic accidents and near-accidents, assessing changes in cautiousness as well as cognitive (i.e., counterfactual thinking) and emotional mechanisms possibly involved in learning from such experience. Results indicate that people do not become more cautious after accidents, whereas repeated experiences with near-accidents seem to foster less cautious traffic behavior. We discuss emotional and cognitive mechanisms related to these effects, and suggest that cautiousness after near-accidents is associated with assuming personal responsibility and upward counterfactual comparisons. We conclude that the mechanisms involved in learning from near-accidents are theoretically interesting, as well as important for the understanding of safe driving behavior.
•Definition of accidents and the conditions for prevention.•Connection between critical events, management and safety culture.•Safety measures that can be observed.•INFO cards with hazard specific question relating to specific safety barriers.•Safety as a part of the professionalism of doing a good job. The concept “simple accidents” is understood as traumatic events with one victim. In the last 10years many European countries have seen a decline in the number of fatalities, but there still remain many severe accidents at work. In the years 2009–2010 in European countries 2.0–2.4million occupational accidents a year were notified leading to 4500 fatalities and 90,000 permanent disabilities each year. The article looks at the concept “accident” to find similarities and distinctions between major and simple accident characteristics. The purpose is to find to what extent the same kinds of prevention or safety methodologies and procedures established for major accidents are applicable to simple accidents. The article goes back to basics about accidents causes, to review the nature of successful prevention techniques and to analyze what have been constraints to getting this knowledge used more broadly. This review identifies gaps in the prevention of simple accidents, relating to safety barriers for risk control and the management processes that need to be in place to deliver those risk controls in a continuingly effective state. The article introduces the “INFO cards” as a tool for the systematic observation of hazard sources in order to ascertain whether safety barriers and management deliveries are present. Safety management and safety culture, together with the INFO cards are important factors in the prevention process. The conclusion is that we must look at safety as a part of being a professional in all kinds of jobs and occupations as well as at management level.